Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy? by Mattoo, Aaditya
.O  2 /V
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2191
Can No Antitrust Policy  Partial  antitrust policy may
lead to less  competitive
Be Better Than Some  market structures  than the
Antitrust Policy?  total  absence  of such  policy.
There may sometimes  even
be  a case for the government
Aaditya Mattoo  providing  incentives  for




















































































































d| POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2191
Summary  findings
Mattoo examines  how the market  structure  is likely  to  For one thing, partial antitrust policy  may  lead to less
evolve  where  there is multistage  oligopolistic  production  competitive  market  structures  than the total absence  of
- and what the implications  of this are for antitrust  such policy,  because  policy  barriers  to horizontal  mergers
policy.  only  at a particular  stage  of production  eliminate  the
Mattoo treats the decision  to merge  across  or within  deterrent effect of retaliatory  merger.  For example,  if the
stages  of production as endogenous.  He shows  that when  two stages  of production  are located  in countries  with
firms at a particular  stage  of production  are relatively  different  antitrust legislation,  a policy  that protects
dominant, simultaneous  merger decisions  are conducive  consumers  from domestic  mergers  may ultimately  hurt
to competitive  vertically  integrated  outcomes,  while  them by rendering  foreign  mergers  more attractive.
sequential  decisions  are not.  When the equilibrium  market  structure  does not
The persistence  of nonintegrated  market structures  contain socially  undesirable  mergers,  there is no need for
may  be explained  by the existence  of equally  dominant  antitrust (or competition)  policy.
firms that make merger  decisions  sequentially.  The  Moreover,  there may  sometimes  be a case  for the
credible  threat of retaliatory  merger  may deter both  government  actually  providing  supplementary  incentives
socially  desirable  and undesirable  forms  of merger.  to encourage  particular  forms of merger  - as, for
What implications  do Mattoo's findings  have  for  instance,  when the threat of retaliatory  merger deters
antitrust policymakers?  socially  desirable  vertical  mergers.
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It has for long been  recognised  that modelling  the merger  decision  as endogenous  is likely  to
be fruitful. As Salant,  et al. (1983,  p. 374),  wrote, "This...approach  is exciting  because  it would
permit predictions  about  which  mergers  are contained  in the set of equilibria  and which  mergers
will never occur.  Antitrust authorities  need not concern themselves  with blocking mergers
outside the equilibrium  set, since market forces would prevent their occurrence;  for the same
reason, the government  could not cause such mergers to occur (without  using supplementary
incentives)  even  if they  would  be socially  desirable. Finally,  such  models  may ultimately  help  us
understand  the evolution  of industry  structure  over  time as coalitions  form and regroup."
Much of the existing literature  on horizontal  and vertical  merger  reveals  two inadequacies.
Merger is usually treated as an exogenous  change  in the market structure,  and each form of
merger is treated  as the outcome  of an independent  decision.I While there have been several
recent  attempts  to treat the decision  to merge  as endogenous,  there  has so far been no analysis  of
multistage  oligopolistic  production  where  both horizontal  and vertical  merger  are options. This
paper seeks,  not only to endogenise  the decision  to merge,  but to examine  which,  if any, of the
two forms  of merger  will take place  when both  are possible.
Allowing  for the possibility  of both horizontal  and vertical mergers  enables  us to pose the
following  question: is one form of merger  universally  more likely  to occur in the absence of
restraining  legislation,  or does the result depend  on factors such as the initial market structure
and  the manner  in which  various  participants  move? This is of particular  interest  because  there is
a general presumption  that horizontal  integration  leads to an anti-competitive  outcome  (in the
absence of  significant economies of scale), while vertical integration is likely to  be pro-
competitive  (unless  there  is significant  vertical  foreclosure).
1These issues have wider  significance since they relate to  the more general problem  of
coalition formation, relevant, for instance, to multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in the
extractive industries.  Thus  while there  is  evidence of  NINEs forming joint  ventures  and
colluding with each other - witness the cartels of raw material and oil producers - there is also
considerable evidence of MNE's in oligopolistic situations resorting to vertical integration either
as  a device  for pre-empting a rival or for punishing a  rival for a  similar move  undertaken
elsewhere (see Caves (1996) for a survey of this literature).  As noted, for instance by Scherer
(1980, p. 90): "When vertical integration induced by fewness of supply sources thins the market
further, other  buyers may  be  stampeded into integrating  as  well  despite appreciable  scale
economy sacrifices.  Dynamics of this sort can be observed in the histories of the U.S.  and
European refrigerator-freezer industries, the U.S. automobile industry, and the movement by
American steel makers into iron ore mining."  13
The observed variations in behaviour - from collusion at a particular stage of production to
successive vertical integration of oligopolists at different stages of production - have prompted
several  different  explanations.  These  include  technological  features,  the  importance  of
transactions costs at different stages of production, and the manner in which agents can best
respond to the riskiness of an environment characterised by uncertain demand or input supplies.
This paper focuses purely on the interdependence of oligopolistic producers operating at each
stage of production.
The  importance  of  two  features  in  determining  the  emergent  market  structures  is
highlighted:  first,  whether  or  not  firms  at  a  particular stage  of  production  are relatively
dominant, and, second, whether firms move simultaneously or sequentially. Firms at a particular
stage of production are relatively  dominant  when they have the option of merging with each
other and firms at the other stage of production do not.  Empirically, relative dominance may be
2observed where firms at a particular stage are situated in a country or sector where anti-trust
policy does not pose impediments to merger.
Merger moves can be regarded as simultaneous  or as sequential.  The former implies that all
firms must make an offer of merger, including its terms, at the same time.  In the latter case,
firms move in alternate sequence over one or more rounds of moves.  The appropriate solution
concepts in the two  cases are, respectively, the Nash  equilibrium and the  sub-game perfect
equilibrium.  Empirically, simultaneity may be a way of depicting the situation in markets in
which if there were first movers in the merger game, they would gain significantly at the expense
of others.
The basic results can be summarised as follows:
1. When firms at one stage of production are relatively dominant, whether the equilibrium
market structure is pro-competitive (i.e. vertically integrated) or anti-competitive (horizontally
integrated)  depends  on  whether  the  dominant  firms  act  simultaneously  or  sequentially.
Simultaneous behaviour is conducive to competitive outcomes. The result arises because the
payoffs  of  the  relatively  dominant  firms  have  a  "prisoners'  dilemma"  structure:  in  the
simultaneous move merger game, there is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in which each
firm independently chooses vertical integration, and the integrated units compete fiercely against
each other.  This outcome is strictly inferior for the relatively dominant firms than horizontal
merger with each other, but the latter outcome only emerges as a sub-game perfect equilibrium in
a sequential move merger in which each firm can base its decision on the choices of the other.
2. When all firms are equally dominant, and merger moves are sequential, the most likely
outcome is no merger at all.  Even though each merger is in itself profitable, ceteris paribus, the
credible threat of retaliatory merger creates sufficient disincentives to initiating either form ofmerger. Horizontal merger of firms at one stage is deterred because it would optimally provoke a
merger also of firms at the other stage, leading to a situation of successive monopoly, which
results in a decline in industry profits because it is highly inefficient.  Vertical merger between
two firms is deterred because it would optimally provoke a vertical merger also of the other two
firms, leading to a situation of low cost duopoly, which also results in  a decline in industry
profits because it is highly competitive.
The most striking implication for policy is that partial anti-trust policy may lead to  less
competitive market-structures than the total absence of such policy . The reason is that a policy
which creates barriers to horizontal merger only at a particular stage of production, eliminates the
deterrent effect of  retaliatory merger.  In particular, if  stages  are located in  countries with
differing anti-trust legislation, a policy which protects consumers from domestic mergers may
actually hurt them by rendering foreign mergers more attractive.
It  is  also noteworthy that  there may sometimes be a  case for the government  actually
providing supplementary incentives to encourage particular forms of merger.  This would be the
case when the threat of retaliatory merger deters socially desirable vertical mergers.
In the next section the basic assumptions of the model are described.  Section II contains a
discussion of  the  appropriate solution concept,  after which  the  alternative market  structure
equilibria are examined in Section III.  Section IV discusses some implications of the analysis.
1.  THE MODEL
There are two stages of production - the first can be thought of as 'mining' and the second as
'refining'  of  a  mineral.  There  can be  three kinds  of  firms:  'mines' which  produce  crude,
4'refineries' which produce the final good, and those which do both, vertically integrated firms
(VIFs). The following symbols are used:
Final good producers (refineries)  RI,  R2
Intermediate good producers (mines)  M1,  M2
Vertical integration (VI)  (Al+RO), (M2+R 2)
Horizontal  integration (HI)  (M 1+M2), (R+R2)
The incentive to integrate vertically arises from the desire to circumvent the mark-up over
variable cost charged in the intermediate good market.  By eliminating the inefficiency arising
from double-marginalization, the VIF effectively gains a competitive edge in  the final good
market, so that the constituent firms together gain at the expense of the rest of the industry. 2 The
incentive to integrate horizontally at either stage of production arises from the increase in the
monopoly power that such integration involves. 3 Through integration, Cournot duopolists gain
by internalizing the inframarginal losses that they impart to  each other when they decide on
output levels independently.
There are several choices to be made regarding the depiction of the merger process.  The
whole process is viewed as a two stage game: first, a stage in which various forms of merger are
considered and accomplished, described by assumptions (A6) to (A10); second, the market stage,
where  the game  is  played according to  Cournot  rules  between firms at  the same stage  of
production, while firms at the earlier stage of production are price leaders vis-a-vis those at a
later stage of production, described by assumptions (Al) to (A5).
First, regarding the demand conditions it is assumed that:
5Al.  The final demand function is linear.  The inverse demand function is of the form p = 1 - Y,
where p is the price of the final good and Y the total output of the final good. 4
As work by Seade (1985), Bulow, et al. (1985) and others has shown, linearity does impose
a significant restriction in oligopolistic situations. The assumption is used here to obtain explicit
solutions for profits of the firms under different market structures.
Regarding the production conditions it is assumed:
A2. The production function can be written (through appropriate choice of units) in the form y
x, where y is a refinery's output of the final good and x the input of crude.  Mines  produce
the intermediate good, "crude",  costlessly.  Refining uses solely the input from the mine.
Hence, the marginal cost of an unintegrated refinery is the price of crude charged by the
mine, while the marginal cost of a vertically integrated firm is zero.
Note that the total production costs in both the vertically integrated and the unintegrated case are
zero - i.e., the mine mark-up in the latter case is not a cost of production, but only a transfer from
the refinery to the mine.  There is no significant loss in generality in assuming away costs of
production when there  are no  economies of merger.  The assumption of  fixed coefficients
technology makes it simple to obtain the derived demand for crude - although it does impose a
significant restriction compared to allowing for variable proportions (see Waterson (1982) for a
more general treatment).  Given this assumption, the existence of other inputs can be ignored
without further loss of generality, provided they are supplied competitively and produced using
constant returns to scale technology.
6A3. There is a single period (one-shot) homogeneous good Cournot duopoly at each stage of
production.  There is complete information regarding the demand function and the cost
functions of all firms, and this is common knowledge.
A4. Refineries exercise market power only  vis-a-vis consumers and  not vis-a-vis the mines,
whose price they take as parametrically given; i.e. mines act as "price leaders" vis-a-vis the
unintegrated refineries.
This assumption is needed to render the non-merger situation determinate and thus provide a
clear reference point for establishing the nature of outside options. There is as yet no satisfactory
theory of how intermediate good prices are determined in situations of successive monopoly or
oligopoly.  Assumption  (A2) is  frequently made  in  the  literature and  is  reasonable  if  the
decisions of the intermediate good producers precede those of the final good producers (see
Lewis et al. (1986) and Salinger (1988)).5
A5. VIFs make the Cournot conjecture about the behaviour of rival final good producers;  the
VIFs do not buy or sell the intermediate good.
These assumptions are made to simplify the analysis.  Assuming that the VIF withdraws
from the intermediate good market  is in  conformity with results  obtained in the  literature. 6
Given our assumptions, it is possible to show that a VIF makes greater profits by processing any
single unit of the input itself and selling the resultant output on the final good market than by
selling the unit of input to rivals. 7 Strangely, it turns out to be more difficult to show that a VIF
would not buy the input in order to raise rivals costs even though it can produce it more cheaply
itself. However, this possibility raises complex issues about the nature of firms' conjectures from
which we choose to abstract in this paper. 8
7A6. The  decision to  merge involves only  two  firms, is  irreversible and  involves a  binding
commitment to maximise the joint profits of the constituent firms. 9
The utilities of the owners of firms are identical to the profits of the firms, which can be
distributed freely within a merged unit - i.e. utility is transferable.
The distribution of profits post-merger is decided between participating firms before the
merger, and it is possible to write binding contracts to enforce this.  Both the negotiations
preceding the merger and the writing of contracts are accomplished costlessly.
Note that the merged entity behaves essentially like a multi-plant firm under the control of a
particular player in  a  non-cooperative game.  Firms have  available the  options  of  forming
alternative mergers when bargaining over the profits from a particular merger.  Whether they
have the time to use these options will depend on which of the following is assumed:
A7(a). The merger stage is a one shot simultaneous move game, followed by a one shot game in
the market stage.
or (b). The merger stage is a sequential move game, followed by a one shot game in the market
stage.  Firms move alternately in the merger stage playing one or more rounds of moves,
and enter the market stage either  (i) when two firms have merged, and the other two have
had an opportunity to react by merging or not merging, or (ii) when each firm has had an
opportunity to react to the decision of the other firms not to merge.
How these alternative assumptions influence the nature of options available to firms will be
discussed later.  But note that assuming the firms move simultaneously in the one-shot merger
stage implies that if they fail to agree on the terms of a merger, they only have the option of
remaining unmerged.  When the merger stage is a sequential move game, Assumption (A7b)
ensures that merger is not a precondition for entry into the market stage.
8Regarding the costs of merger itself, the following weak assumption is made:
A8. If a particular merger and staying unmerged offer the same payoffs to a firm, it prefers to
stay unmerged.
If a particular merger A (horizontal or vertical) offers a firm even slightly (s) greater profits
than staying unmerged, UI, or another merger B (horizontal or vertical), the firm prefers A to
UI and B.
This assumption implies that the price at which a firm will accept to merge must be 6 above
the alternative, and this turns out to be an important tie-breaking rule (an alternative would be
simply to assume that the transactions costs of implementing a merger are £).
In  the  sequential move  merger  games, only  the  following weak  assumption  is  made
regarding the time preference of firms and the termination of the merger stage:
A9. Between two identical outcomes at different points of time, the firm prefers the earlier one.
The firms do  not want  to  delay indefinitely the market  stage in  which the payoffs are
obtained.
This  "negligible" time preference simply means, in the sequential case, that firms would
prefer that  any  specific eventual equilibrium be  reached after a minimum number of offer-
response rounds.
The numerals 1 and 2 are used to distinguish between the two mines and the two refineries,
and the following simplifying assumption is made:
9Al0.  Mine 1 and refinery 1 consider vertical merger (VI) only with each other, as do mine 2
refinery 2, i.e. diagonal mergers are ruled out.
The crucial issue is as to how the payoffs within the merged unit are decided. To begin with,
the profits accruing to various units under the different market structures can be calculated and
are depicted in Table  1 (note that we suppress the negligible cost of delay, if any, from our
computed profits).  Given assumptions (Al)  to (A5) it is straightforward to obtain these values
from the standard Cournot duopoly model and the mathematical detail has been relegated to the
Appendix.
[TABLE 11
The initial situation, with no integration, is depicted in row (4).  To see the intuition for the
levels of profits and prices associated with different outcomes, we can identify two types of
externalities that arise between firms in this model:  a horizontal externality between firms at the
same  stage  of  production,  and  a  vertical  externality  between  firms  at  different  stages  of
production.  The horizontal externality is that any decision by a mine (or refinery) to expand
output, leads to  a decline in prices which reduces the profit of the other mine (or refinery).
However,  Cournot  duopolists, which  maximize  their  own profits,  do  not  take their  rivals'
incremental profits into account, and therefore tend to  overproduce relative to the joint-profit
maximizing level of output. The vertical externality is, first, that any decision made by a refinery
that increases demand for the intermediate good generates increased profit for mines.  Similarly,
any decision by  a mine to  expand output, reduces crude prices and increases the profits  of
refineries. However, neither the refineries nor the mines, which maximize their own profits, take
into account the incremental profits of firms at the other stage of production, and therefore tend
to make decisions which lead to underproduction relative to joint-profit maximizing levels of
output.
10HI between two mines (or two refineries) benefits participants (for any given structure of the
rest of the industry) because they internalise the inframarginal losses that they impart to each
other when they decide on output levels independently, so that the merged unit produces the
monopoly level of output.  But the merger hurts firms at the other stage because the resultant
price increase worsens the negative spillover on them. 1I  VI between a mine and a refinery
benefits participants (for any given structure of the rest of the industry) because it eliminates one
of the two successive mark-ups (or double-marginalization) and leads to an expansion of output
to the efficient level. But it hurts rivals because it worsens the negative effect that they suffer
through the reduction in prices caused by increased output.
It is well known that with fixed factor proportions and successive monopoly (rather than
successive duopoly), double marginalization leads to a price in excess of the monopoly price that
would occur with VI (Tirole, 1989), lowering both profits and consumer surplus.  And this is
what we in fact see in the first outcome in Table 1:  if the horizontally integrated firms were
permitted to then vertically merge into a monopoly industry, price would be 0.5, a price between
that in outcomes 4 and 5.
For the industry as a whole, fragmentation (outcome 4) serves to dampen competition and
raise prices  above those  that would  be  charged by  a vertically  integrated Cournot duopoly
(outcome 7), toward the monopoly price.  Indeed, the price with fragmentation is a little bit
higher than the monopoly price.
As expected, final good price is highest in outcome (1), i.e. HI at both stages, and diminishes
(or stays unchanged) down through the rows, being least in outcome (7), i.e. VI of successive
duopolists.  It is straightforward to show that social welfare, measured as the unweighted sum of
consumers surplus and firms profits, is least for outcome (1) and increases through to outcome
11(7). This confirms, in the context of the model, that vertical integration is socially more desirable
than horizontal integration.  Profits are maximized by complete integration, but  attention is
restricted to single mergers.
11.  SOLUTION CONCEPTS
For a merger to be consummated, we need only to specify that for the two firms involved the
opportunities on the merger frontier exceed those  from, ceteris paribus, the alternatives (not
merging or selecting an  alternative merger).  Then they would merge and share the gains of
moving to the frontier in some fashion which is Pareto superior relative to both neither merging
nor selecting an alternative merger.  For concreteness, we wish to show the profits of each firm,
to demonstrate the gains from merger.  To implement a functional form for the profit sharing
rule, we  use a  particular interpretation of the  well-known Nash  bargaining  solution to  the
problem (qualitative results are insensitive to this formulation).  "I  This solution concept will be
seen to imply, in the present context, a simple sharing rule: profits from each merger are divided
equally between the participants, unless either party can obtain more from an alternative merger
or by staying unmerged.
The Nash bargaining solution to the two-player/one-cake  problem involves maximising:
(ii  - si)(rj  Si)
subject to 7ci  +  crj  =  7r  Y 
and  Ti > s1 ,  j > sj,  rr 1 i >  roi,  j >  'oj
where:
7it  are the total profits of the merged firm,
12ni,  7cj  are the payoffs to individual firms within the merged unit,
si,  sj  are the status quo points,
7C,j , Tj  are the outside options.
It is necessary to establish the nature of (a) the 'status quo' point which fixes the origin with
respect to which the maximisation exercise is carried out, and (b) the 'outside options' which fix
the minimum profits acceptable to the two parties, and are only relevant if the unconstrained
Nash solution were to allocate profits to one party below this level.  Here, as in Birnmore  (1985),
the distinction lies in that the outside option is something to which the firm can voluntarily
withdraw while the  status quo is the payoff which the firm earns if the bargaining process
continues  unsuccessfully for  an  indefinite  period, i.e.  the  'disagreement point'.  Since  the
situation has been depicted as a two stage game, and the market stage is only entered after the
negotiation stage, the firms are not operating as such until the bargaining has been concluded.  So
it is appropriate to regard the firms as earning nothing while the bargaining process continues
inconclusively, therefore I put si = sj = 0.
The outside options, 7rj,  7ro.  are the profits earned either if the firm stays unmerged or if it
enters into alternative mergers, depending on whether the latter option is open to it when it is
bargaining.  This will depend on the specification of the merger process, and for each of the
following situations an appropriate definition will be suggested.
The crucial issue is how outside options, i.e. the possibility of forming alternative mergers or
staying  unmerged,  affect  the  payoffs  within  the  merged  unit.  There  is  an  obvious
interdependence here, in that a firm's potential profits from one merger are an outside option for
it in another merger and vice versa. The next section is devoted to the solution of this problem.
13III. ALTERNATIVE MARKET STRUCTURE EQUILIBRIA
In  this  section,  I  establish  the  nature  of  market  structure  equilibria  under  alternative
assumptions about the temporal structure of the model, i.e. variants of assumption (A7).  This is
done in two stages.  First, a two-person non-cooperative game between the mines is studied.
This is done by assuming that the input producers or mines, Ml and M2, are relatively dominant,
i.e. they have the option of merging horizontally while the final good producers or refineries, R1
and R 2 do not.  It will also be convenient to assume that it is the relatively dominant mines which
can initiate integration with the refineries, and that the latter are 'passive'. After this we present a
more general case, in which all firms are equally dominant.  This marks a shift from the earlier
"two-person game" to  a  "four-person game."  In this  case, for simplicity, attention will  be
restricted to the situation where merger moves are sequential.
A. Relatively dominant mines,  passive refineries: simultaneous moves
In  this  section,  the  consequences of  assumptions  (Al)  to  (Al0)  including  (A7a)  are
examined: relatively dominant mines, M 1 and M2 move simultaneously in the one shot merger
stage of the game, after which there is a one-shot market stage.
Each mine can do one of three things: (i) remain unintegrated, UI, (ii) merge with a final
good producer, VI, - it  is assumed that Ml considers merger with RI, and M2 with R2, or (iii)
offer to merge with the other mine - the offer is represented by the notation "HI?".  Each mine
simultaneously makes an offer of merger, including its terms, to one other firm.  If the offers
match both in the choice of firm and the terms, they merge, otherwise they stay unmerged.  There
is no possibility of switching to another firn:  the only outside option is to stay unmerged.  The
matching offers, which  are also the payoffs from successful merger, are calculated using the
Nash bargaining solution: as if they were the outcome of actual bargaining with only non-merger
14profits as outside options.1 2 In effect the four-person/four cake problem has been broken into
four two-person/one-cake  problems.
If Ml chooses VI, then while it is bargaining with R,, it only has an outside option of staying
unmerged, given the one shot nature of the game.  There are two possibilities: either M2 and R 2
do not merge, i.e. outcome 5, or they also merge, i.e. outcome 7.  In the former case the profits
to be divided are 0.1837, and the outside options for Ml and RI, i.e. their profits from staying
unmerged, are 0.0494 and 0.0741, respectively (see outcome 4).  These are strictly less than the
shares determined by the unconstrained Nash bargaining solution, 0.0918 to each. In the case of
outcome 7, the profits to be divided are 0.1111, and the outside options for Ml and RI are 0.0204
and 0.0408, respectively (see outcome 6), which are also strictly less than the shares determined
by the unconstrained Nash bargaining solution, 0.0555 to each.  The payoffs to M2 and R 2 from
outcomes 6 and 7 can be similarly calculated.  Table 2 depicts the payoffs to Ml and M2 from
each of their different actions.
[TABLE 21
The parenthetical terms in Table 2 refer to the outcomes as presented in Table 1.  The first
item in each box is the payoff to Ml and the second the payoff to M2. These payoffs, anticipated
by the firms in their merger decisions, have a "prisoners' dilemma" structure: there is a dominant
strategy Nash equilibrium: outcome 7 (MlI+R, M2+R2), i.e. both M 1 and M2 integrate forward
into the final stage, and compete more fiercely against each other.  This is strictly inferior for
them than outcome 2 (M1+M 2, RI,  R2), i.e. horizontal merger, and  even outcome 4, i.e. no
merger, but neither can risk offering HI? or choosing UI in a one shot simultaneous move game.
Hence:
15PROPOSITION 1: Given assumptions (Al) to (A.10)  including (A7a) (i.e. simultaneous moves),
with relatively dominant mines and passive  refineries, the unique Nash equilibrium involves
vertical integration of each intermediate good producer with a final good producer.
The realism of modelling merger decisions as a one-shot simultaneous move game may be
questioned since it is almost always possible for other firms to retaliate.  However, retaliation
may take time.  The distinction made in the paper between simultaneous and sequential move
games is based on the relative lengths of time of the merger and market stages.  In some cases,
first movers in the merger stage of a game can make significant gains in the product market
before others are able to conclude negotiations on a retaliatory merger.  Thus no one can afford
to wait for others to move first, so firms may be stampeded into merging - even though multiple
mergers may lead to lower profits for everyone.
B. Relatively dominant mines,  passive refineries. sequential moves
All the assumptions of the previous section are retained except (A7a), which is replaced by
(A7b).  The merger stage is now assumed to be a sequential (alternating) move game of possibly
several rounds played once, which continues till market structure equilibrium (if it exists) is
reached.  The decision to merge is irreversible, while the decision not to merge is reversible until
the merger stage is terminated.  Each mine has one additional element in its choice set: it can
accept  an offer from the other mine to merge horizontally - denoted by "HI!".
To see how the game proceeds, assume Ml moves first.  As in the previous game, it can do
one of three things: (i) remain unintegrated, UI;  (ii) merge with a final good producer, VI;  or
(iii) offer to merge with the other mine, HI?.  If Ml has chosen UI, then M2 has available to it the
same three options:  UI, VI, HI?.  If, however, Ml has chosen VI, then M2 can choose between
16only Ul and VI, and the merger stage concludes once it has chosen either option (see A7(b)(i)).
If Ml has chosen HI?, then M2 again has three options open to it:  UJ, VI, HI!.  If it chooses HI!,
the merger stage concludes.  Except in the three conclusion scenarios, (VI,UI), (VI,VI), (HI?,
HI!), after M2's move Ml has an opportunity to move again.  If the previous choices of both had
been UI, and if Ml chooses Ul again, then the merger stage concludes - since each firm has had
an opportunity to  react to the decision of the other firm not to merge (A7(b)(ii)).  The other
possible paths down the game tree can be worked out similarly.
In this game, as distinct from the simultaneous one, a mine, when bargaining over the terms
of a particular merger, may have the outside option offorming an alternative merger, in addition
to the one of staying unmerged. In particular, MI, by virtue of moving first, has the outside
option of offering HI to M2 when it is considering VI with RI.  But if Ml has chosen VI, M2 no
longer has the outside option of HI with M 1 when considering VI with R2.
First note that outcomes (5) and (6) will never be observed as equilibrium market structures,
unless there are partial barriers to VI. If either Ml or M 2 chooses VI, it is in the best interests of
the other to do the same.  E.g. compare from the point of view of M2 and R2, outcomes 5 and 7,
in which Ml and RI have already merged;  they can earn 0.0204 and 0.0408 respectively if they
stay unmerged (5) and 0.0555 each if they too VI (7).  The latter is obtained from the distribution
of 0.1111 from VI, given the merger of Ml and R1 (with outside options of 0.0408 for M2 and
0.0204 for R2 if they stay unmerged).  Clearly VI is preferable to  staying urnerged.  Thus
outcome 7 (M 1+R 1, M2+R 2) is a Nash equilibrium, in which the total expected payoff to each
vertically integrated unit is equal to 0.1111.
Now consider outcomes (2) and (7), which must be treated differently from Section IIIB.
The most Ml  can obtain from VI with RI is (0.0833-6).  To see this note that the least RI  is
17assured of is 0.0278, which are its profits from staying unmerged given that the mines have
merged (outcome 2).  By assumption (A8), regarding the costs of merger, RI will want at least e
more to induce it to accept VI rather than stay unmerged. The size of the cake obtainable from
VI is 0. 1111, as shown above. Hence, the most Ml can get is 0. 111  1-(0.0278+6),  which gives the
above expression.
If Ml  offers HI? to M2, the latter can accept HI!, choose Ul or initiate VI with R2. At this
stage, with Ml unmerged, the most M2 would get from VI is also (0.0833-c) (which is greater
than the most available from Ul, i.e.0.0741). After taking into account their maximum possible
outside  options, the  Nash bargaining solution divides the profits  from  HI,  0.1666, equally
between Ml and M2, i.e. each gets 0.0833 from outcome 2.  The second mover status means that
M2 gets less than Ml if the latter chooses VI, but does not affect the sharing of profits from HI.
[TABLE  31
Given the payoffs from outcome 2, the payoffs to the two mines from outcomes (5), (6) and
(7) can be similarly calculated and are presented in Table 3.  The choices by Ml in period 3 that
do not have a final outcome as the end, lead either to previously achievable outcomes in later
periods or indefinite delay in the attainment of market structure equilibrium and entry into the
market stage. These are ruled out by the assumption of weak time preference (A9).
Outcome 7 (MI  +R]j,  M2+R2) continues to be a Nash equilibrium (albeit, as we shall see, not
sub-game perfect) in this game as well, as noted above.  If either mine chooses VI, it will expect
the other to do the same, since it is in the latter's best interest to do so.  But this involves less
18profits for the mines than outcome 2 (MI+M 2, RI, R2).  Given the assumption of weak time
preference (A9), Ml will straightaway offer HI? and M2 will accept HI!. Hence:
PROPOSITION 2: Given assumptions (Al) to (A.10)  including (A7b) (i.e. sequential moves), with
relatively  dominant mines  and passive  refineries,  the unique sub-game perfect  equilibrium
involves horizontal merger of the mines.
It is evident that if the option of VI is not open to a particular mine, then the other mine will
choose VI, e.g. Ml prefers (5) to (2).  Without the threat of retaliatory VI, the gains from VI
outweigh those from HI.
C. Mines and refineries are equally dominant: sequential moves
In this general situation, each firm can offer the relevant other firm HI? or VI?, accept an
offer HI! or VI!, or choose UI.  The merger stage is again assumed to be a sequential (alternating)
move  game of  possibly  several rounds played  once, which  continues  till  market  structure
equilibrium (if it exists) is reached, after which there is a one-shot market stage.  The important
difference from the previous section is that now the refineries can offer and accept HI as well.
The similarity is that the firms can base their decisions on the choices of other firms.  There are
several different ways of describing this  game, for instance by specifying a precise order in
which players move.  However, the object here is to obtain fairly general results so that little
specific structure is provided. The first thing to be established is that:
LEMMA 1:  The threat of retaliatory merger is credible, i.e. if any two firms merge, it is in the
best interests of the other two  firms to  do the same.
19For example, say Ml and M2 have merged.  If RI and R2 stay unmerged they earn 0.0278
each (Table 1: outcome 2).  If they merge (outcome 1) the Nash bargaining solution gives them
each 0.0313, greater than their identical outside options of  staying unmerged.  This  can be
established for each of the other forms of merger.  It emerges that outcome 1 (M 1+M 2, R1+R 2)
and outcome 7 (MK+Rl,  M2+R2) are two of the Nash equilibria in this game, which implies that
the threat of retaliatory merger is credible.  Asymmetric outcomes, like outcome 2 (M 1+M 2, RI,
R2) and outcome 6 (MI, RI, M2+R 2), etc. will never be observed as market equilibria.
It has been established that outcomes (2), (3), (5) and (6), involving partial merger, cannot
be  final equilibrium outcomes, while (1) and  (7) are both  Nash equilibria.  However,  it is
possible to show that the maximum payoff for each firm is from outcome (4), i.e. no merger at all
- an outcome which also maximises industry profits (given the available choices).  On this basis,
we seek to establish that:
LEMMA 2:  The credible threat of retaliatory merger deters all mergers.
We need to demonstrate that each firm prefers to  stay unmerged, provided no other firms
merge, to merger given that other firms will also merge.  Consider Ml.  The most it could get
from merger with M2 is 0.0695.  This is the difference between 0.1250, the total profits from
merger (outcome 1), and 0.0555, the profits M2 can be sure of even if Ml  has already merged
with RI (see Section IIIC).
The best possible outside option for MK,  when it is bargaining with RI, is therefore 0.0695.
Since the profts that MI and RI would obtain from merger are 0.1111 (outcome 7), the outside
option constraint is binding for Ml, so it can expect to get 0.0695.  Thus Ml would get less from
20merger with either K! 2 or RI than what it could get from staying unmerged if no one else merges,
0.0741 (outcome 4).
Similar reasoning establishes that M2, R1 and R 2 can each do better by staying unmerged
provided no one else merges.  So the optimal strategy for each firm is simply to refrain from
merger provided no one else merges, and to participate in  a retaliatory merger the moment
someone else merges.  Thus, each firm in its turn will choose UI, and given Assumption (A7b),
they will enter the market stage once each has had an opportunity to react to the decision of the
others not to merge.  If any two firms were to merge, Assumption (A7b) would ensure that the
merger stage would continue until the other firms had a chance to react.  In sum, the threat of
retaliatory merger will be a credible and effective deterrent to any merger.
PROPOSITION  3:  Given assumptions  (Al)  to  (A.10) including  (A7b)  (i.e. the firms  move
sequentially), with both mines and refineries equally dominant, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium involves no merger at all.
Comparing this with the previous section, it is evident how potential countervailing power
can lead to  relatively pro-competitive outcomes, i.e. it is an  effective deterrent to  the  anti-
competitive horizontal merger.  It is the fear of the unprofitable successive monopoly situation
which deters merger, because the gains from reducing competition within a stage are more than
offset by the losses from increased prices at the other stage.  But there is also a deterrent to the
pro-competitive vertical merger.  Here it is the fear of highly competitive low-cost duopoly
situation that deters merger.  The gains from eliminating the mark-up over marginal costs are
more than offset by the expansion in the rival's output.
It is also possible to establish:
21PROPOSITION  4:  Given  assumptions  (Al)  to  (A10)  including  (A7b),  i.e.  firms  move
sequentially, if two specific  firms are prohibitedfrom  merging with each other, but all other two
firm  combinations are permitted,  then there is one unique merger which will occur, and  it
involves the merger of the other two firms.
From  an  examination of  situations where  two firms  cannot merge  with  each  other,  it
emerges that in each case the symmetric merger is most attractive, i.e. if vertical merger between
two firms is not possible, the vertical merger of the other two firms will occur, and not horizontal
merger at each stage.  And, as seen in Section IIIC, if horizontal merger at one stage is not
possible, the horizontal merger of the other two firms will occur, not  vertical mergers across
stages. Thus the firms which cannot merge with one another will be left out of any merger.  This
is a consequence of the feature that retaliatory merger is most damaging, and the firms will
choose the strategy which leaves no possibility of its happening.
IV. IMPLICATIONS  OF THE RESULTS
This paper treated the decision to merge as endogenous in  a simple model of two-stage
duopolistic production.  In  the process,  it demonstrated how equilibrium market  structures
depend on whether firms move simultaneously or sequentially, and whether firms at a particular
stage of production are relatively dominant.  Section IIIA showed that loss-making mergers
could occur when firms have to take merger decisions as if they were simultaneous.  This may be
a reasonable depiction of circumstances in which the first mover in a merger game would reap
significant benefits, so that no one can afford to wait for the others to move first.  It is the
prisoner's dilemma structure of payoffs which makes multiple merger.  difficult to prevent despite
their negative impact on each firm's profits.  McBride (1983), in a study of the U.S. cement
industry, found evidence of multiple VI which led to a decline in industry profits.
22Some situations are better approximated by depicting the firms as moving sequentially, so
that they can base their decisions on the actual and rationally expected decisions of other firms.
In these situations, I suggest, it is the relative dominance of some firms, or the absence of it,
which will determine the outcome. Horizontal merger, or the formation of collusive oligopolies,
is likely when the firms at one stage are relatively dominant and have no fear of the firms at
another stage indulging in retaliatory merger - as in Section IIIB.
Vickers (1984) identified the possible strategic advantage to be had from non-integration.
The results of Section IIIC, i.e. the equilibrium with no merger, point to a similar possibility.
Firms refrain from VI which would commit them to competing fiercely against each other and
hence  lead  to  a  decline in  collective profits.  They also  refrain  from  HI because  of  the
unattractiveness of successive monopoly.  (The important assumption here is that successive
monopoly will  involve the highly  inefficient double marginalisation and  not  a  cooperative
equilibrium between the monopolists at different stages.)  The threat of retaliatory mergers is
crucial.  Since such mergers are Nash equilibria in the merger game, they constitute credible
threats,  and  effectively deter  any  merger.  This  may explain  both  the persistence  of  non-
integrated market structures in some situations and why firms do not proceed with ostensibly
profitable mergers.
The implications for policy are significant. When the equilibrium market structure does not
contain socially undesirable mergers, there is no  need for anti-trust (or competition) policy.
Furthermore, partial anti-trust policy, which  creates barriers to  horizontal merger only  at a
particular stage of production, may lead to  less competitive market-structures than the total
absence of such policy . For instance, if the two stages of production are located in countries
with differing anti-trust legislation, a policy which protects consumers from domestic mergers
may nevertheless hurt them by rendering foreign mergers more attractive. 
14
23The threat of retaliatory merger does not always play a benign role.  It can also deter socially
desirable vertical mergers.  In this  case, it may be desirable for the government to  provide
supplementary incentives to encourage particular forms of merger.
FOOTNOTES
IE.g. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Kamien and Zang
(1990, 1993) and Bloch (1995) are articles on horizontal merger in oligopolistic situations similar to the one dealt
with here, while Greenhut and Ohta (1979), Salinger (1988,1989), Hart and Tirole (1990), Ordover, et al. (1990)
and Innes and Sexton (1994) are concerned with vertical merger.  Most of the work since 1990 has modeled the
merger decision as endogenous.  More general work on these lines can also be found  in a  new strand  of the
literature analyzing the  formation of coalitions in non-cooperative games with spillovers (see Chatterjee et al.
(1993) for an introduction to this literature, Bloch (1997) for a recent survey and Horn and Persson (1997) for an
application of this approach to the study of mergers).
2The inefficiency could also  be eliminated by the use of two-part rather than  linear-price contracts (see Tirole
(1989), p.  176).  Vertical integration is defined here to include the possibility of  implementing such two-part
tariffs.
3An added incentive for such integration is that it may lead to synergies but this possibility will not be considered.
4Setting the slope and the intercept of the demand function equal to I does not lead to any loss of generality.  The
intercept matters only in relation to marginal cost, and no comparative statics are performed on either.  Setting the
slope equal to I only involves changing units.
5The assumption of successive market power gives input sellers an advantage over output sellers, leading to an
asymmetric distribution of profits in non-integrated situations. It is possible to show that the results of this paper
also hold for more symmetric assumptions about price determination - for instance, in a situation of mutually
related market power where each of two complementary inputs is produced by a duopoly.
246Salinger (1988) concludes, on the basis of certain assumptions about the conjectures that the VIF makes, that the
VIF does not participate in the intermediate good market.  Ordover, et al. (1990) find that vertical foreclosure may
be an equilibrium outcome when the final good is differentiated and firms compete in prices;  they arrive at a
conclusion similar to the above assumption for the case of homogeneous good Coumot duopoly.  However, the
question of how the VIF is likely to behave in the intermediate good market remains to be adequately answered
(see Tirole, 1989,  p. 195).
7A VIF earns price p from a unit sale in the final good market and a price q from a unit sale in the input market.
The VIF makes the Cournot conjecture in the input market, i.e. it believes that other mines will not change their
output in response to changes in its output.  So it expects a unit of input sale  to translate into an additional unit of
final good sales by its rival refineries, and a unit reduction in crude sales to lead to a unit reduction of final good
sales by its rival refineries.  Thus shifting one unit of crude from sales on the crude market to its own refimery's
final good sales is not expected to change the total output of the final good, the final good price or the revenue
from inframarginal sales.  From such a shift the VIF makes a net gain of p - q.  This is positive, since for it to be
profitable for an unintegrated refinery to operate, it is necessary that p - q > 0.
8While in the case of the VIF entering the input market as a seller there is a well-defined derived demand from the
non-integrated refineries, it is difficult to define the appropriate conjectures that the VIF makes as a buyer.  These
issues are examined in detail in Mattoo (1990).  See also Salop and Sheffman (1983) and Krattenmaker and Salop
(1986).
9Most recent mergers have involved only two firms at any point of time.  For instance, Scherer and Ross (1990, p.
153) find that "multifirm consolidations have been extremely rare in the United States since World War I.'
I0Mathewson and Winter (1997) present a similar argument in their analysis of buyer groups in a differentiated
good model.
11The interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution used here follows Binmore (1985).  The Nash solution has
several appealing features.  It has been given a rigorous non-cooperative game-theoretic justification (see e.g.
Rubinstein,  1982),  to  complement  the  earlier  behavioural  (Harsanyi,  1956)  and  axiomatic  (Nash,  1950)
justifications.  It is also fairly tractable, as compared to, for instance, the solution due to Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975).  Finally, it has the attraction of ensuring that the bargain is efficient.
25'2 For there to be a successful horizontal merger, both firms should choose HI?, while a mine can proceed with
vertical merger unilaterally, subject to the requirement that it offers the firm being taken over adequate payoffs.
E.g. if one firm chooses HI? and the other chooses Ul, both remain unmerged, while if one firm chooses HI? and
the other VI, the former remains unmerged and the latter merges forward.  Since the refineries are passive, a 'take-
over' may be a more accurate depiction of VI than a more symmetric merger.  A firm taking over must pay the
shareholders of the firm being taken over a share of the anticipated gain determined by the Nash solution.  Even
though the final good producers are passive, they can resist takeovers and choose to stay unmerged if the Nash
equilibrium terms of the takeover are not suitable.
1 3 See Bolton and Whinston (1993) for an  examination of supply assurance concerns, which arise when several
downstream firms compete for inputs in limited supply, in the context of a transactions costs model of vertical
integration.
140ther inferences can be drawn for the design of competition policy in the international context by specifying
which firms and what proportion of consumer demand fall within a particular regulatory jurisdiction.  The
model then enables us to identify the effects on welfare of domestic and foreign mergers. A similar idea is
explored in Head and Ries (1997).
26APPENDIX
Here it is shown how explicit solutions can be obtained for profits accruing to  each unit
under different market structures. To begin with, take the following general case:
There are n  0,1,2 UL  mines each of whom produces xm units of crude,
k =  0,1,2 UI refineries each of whom produces yr units of the final good
using xr units of crude, and
h = 0,1,2 VIFs each of whom produces yv  units of the final good
using xv  units of crude.
Ul refinery  r chooses xr to maximise its profits given by
7t,r  = p(y)yr  - qxr  =  (p  - q)xr,
since yr =  Xr,  given the assumption about the production function (A2). Note that q is the price of
the intermediate good, taken as given by the refineries who are assumed to be competitive buyers
in this market (A4).  It is profitable for refineries to produce if p  - q  >  0, i.e. the price, p,  is
greater than the cost of producing a single unit of output, q.  Given the assumption of Cournot
conjectures (A3), each UI refinery also takes the output of other final good  producers (UI
refineries or VIFs) as given in the profit maximisation exercise, which yields the following first
order condition
p+xrp'-q  =0,
27where p' is the derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to Y. It is assumed that the
second order conditions for profit maximisation are fulfilled. Summing over k refineries, the
following can be obtained:
p+-q=0,  (1)
where Ar = ar  (summed over k) is the total input demand.
UI mine m  chooses xm  to maximise its profits given by
1Tmn  =  q(X1-p)xm11
which are equal to total revenue since it has been assumed that crude production is costless (A2).
The demand function facing the UI mines is the derived demand given by (1), i.e. the sum of the
marginal revenues of the UI refineries. This follows from the assumed leadership position of the
UI mines vis-a-vis the Ul refineries (A4). Note that if there is only one UI mine and one UI
refinery (the other two firms having chosen VI), then the former behaves as a monopolist vis-a-
vis the latter. The first order condition for profit maximisation for each mine is
dr_  ±  q + xn  =0O
Xm
or  q+  k((k+I)p'+ Xp'r)  =0,
28dXr
using equation (1) and recalling the Cournot conjecture,  - =1.  Summing over n mines, the
following is obtained:
q +s  (k+l I)p' + X`p')  = O  ,  (2) xn
where XI' is the total input supplied by the mines.
The behaviour of the VIFs in the final good market is similar to that of the UI refineries as
far as their conjectures about rivals are concerned, except that the unit cost of their inputs is zero
and not q (from assumption A2).  Each VIF v takes the output of its rival final good producers as
given when it chooses xv to maximise its profits given by
v  = p(y)yV,
which are also equal to  total revenue since there  are no  costs of production.  The relevant
optimising condition for each VIF is:
p  +xvp'=  0,
Summing over h  VIFs, the following is obtained:
p±- 1 -0,  (3)
where Xv  is the total crude used by VIFs for their own production.
29The condition for equilibrium in the crude market is that
XI'7 = X7*  (4)
i.e. the total quantity of input supplied by the UI mines is equal to the total quantity of input
demanded by the UI refineries. Furthermore,
y=  yT+  YV=X+XV  (5)
i.e. the total output of the final good is equal to the sum of the outputs of the UI refineries and of
the VIFs, which, given assumption A2, is equal to the total quantity of crude used by each type
of firm.
Given assumption Al,  i.e. the inverse demand function is linear and of the form p =  I  -Y,




q=  (l +k)(l  +n)+h(l +k+n)'
r  ~~na
Xr
(l + k) (l + n) +  h(l + k +3n)'
Xl77-  ~ka
(l +k)fI  +n)+h(l  +k+n)'
30v =  h(l + k +  n)a
(I + k)(l  + n) +h(l  + k +n)
Now it is straightforward to find the solutions corresponding to different market structures
by substituting the appropriate values for n, k and h.  For instance, where no merger has taken
place, n = k= 2 and h = 0; where a single vertical merger has taken place, n = k = h = 1, and so
on.  These solutions can then be substituted in the respective profit functions to obtain the values
given in Table 1.
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36Table 1: Profits of merged and unmerged firms under alternative market structures
Outcome  Market  Profits of indep.  Total industry  Price of the
number  structure  firms  profits  final good
(1)  (MW+M 2)  0.1250  0.1875  0.75
(RI  +R 2)  0.0625
(MI  +M 2)  0.1666
(2)  RI  0.0278  0.2222  0.67
R2  0.0278
Ml  0.0555
(3)  M2 0.0555  0.2222  0.67
(RI  +R 2)  0.1111
Ml  0.0741




(5)  M2 0.0408  0.2449  0.43
R2  0.0204
Ml  0.0408
(6)  RI  0.0204  0.2449  0.43
(M 2+R 2)  0.1837
(7)  (M,+R 1)  0.1111  0.2222  0.33
(M2+R 2)  0.1111
Note: M and R denote mine and refinery, respectively. The sign + denotes merger.
37Table 2:  Payoffs to the relatively dominant mines with simultaneous moves
M2
UI  VI  HI?
UI  (4) 0.0741, 0.0741  (6) 0.0408, 0.0918  (4) 0.0741, 0.0741
Ml  VI  (5) 0.0918, 0.0408  (7) 0.0555, 0.0555  (5) 0.0918, 0.0408
HI?  (4) 0.0741, 0.0741  (6) 0.0408, 0.0918  (2) 0.0833, 0.0833
38Table 3:  Payoffs to the relatively dominant mines with sequential moves
(2)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
(MI  +M2)  Ml,, M2~  (M,+R,)  MI, RI  (M,+R,)
RI,  R2  Rj, R2  M2,,  R2 (M 2+R 2)  (M 2+R 2)
nM 1 0.0833  0.0741  0.0918  0.0408  0.0833-8
nUM2  0.0833  0.0741  0.0408  0.0918  0.0555
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